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The Alternative Amending Clause in Article V:
Reflections and Suggestions
Morris D. Forkosch*
I. INTRODUCTION
Current efforts to amend the Constitution to reverse or mod-
ify Baker v. Carr' and allow state legislatures to apportion them-
selves on standards other than the Supreme Court's "one man,
one vote" standard necessitate a review of the Constitution's
amending provisions.2 Article V of the Constitution provides
two methods for proposing constitutional amendments. First,
amendments may be proposed by two-thirds of both Houses of
Congress. Second, "on the application of the Legislatures of two-
thirds of the several states, [Congress] shall call a convention
for proposing amendments." Since 1787, the Constitution has
been amended twenty-five times. In each case, the amendments
were proposed by Congress pursuant to the first alternative.3
As a result, the appropriate powers and procedures relating to
the first alternative are clearly understood.
4
Given Congress' apparent unwillingness to take the initiative
concerning a reapportionment amendment,5 the question becomes
whether Congress will be forced to call a Constitutional Conven-
tion under the second alternative. Since the Baker decision in
1962, at least thirty-two state legislatures have sent forty-seven
separate communications to Congress urging the proposal of a
reapportionment amendment. Many of these communications
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
1. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
2. Perhaps the ' Dirksen amendment" best typifies these current
efforts. On January 6, 1965, Senator Dirksen and a number of other
Republicans proposed that the Constitution be amended "to preserve to
the people of each State power to determine the composition of its leg-
islature and the apportionment of the membership thereof." S. J. Res.
2, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). See also 111 CONG. REc. 166, 235 (daily
ed. Jan. 6, 1965) (remarks of Senators Dirksen and Douglas).
3. Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 373-74 (1921). See also Christian
Science Monitor, April 3, 1967, p. 9.
4. See, e.g., Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) (adoption and
ratification); Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921) (proposal procedures);
Keogh v. Neely, 50 F.2d 685, cert. denied, 284 U.S. 583 (1931) (methods).
5. The Dirksen proposal was sent to the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee where it died.
6. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota,
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requested Congress to call for a Constitutional Convention,7
while others asked Congress to take the initiative as they have
with previous amendments.8 Some states requested both pro-
cedures,9 resulting in uncertainty as to which should control.
Even though the requests have not been uniform in substance or
form, application by two-thirds or more states would appear to
impose a mandatory obligation on Congress to call a Convention
under the second alternative. This Article will consider the here-
tofore unused alternative in article V, the problems involved in
its operation, and its proper role in the amending process.
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE AMENDING CLAUSE
In general, the scheme of the Constitution's amending pro-
cedure is not very complex. Article V provides that amendments
may be proposed either by two-thirds of both Houses of Congress
or by a Convention called at the request of two-thirds of the
states. The method of ratification of the proposed amendments
is determined by Congress; ratification may be by three-fourths
of the state legislatures or by three-fourths of state conventions.
The President has no power or place in the amending proc-
ess,1° and, except to the extent construction of the law is re-
quired, neither has the judiciary." The states, with respect to
their role in the amending process, may resist any federal inter-
ference,12 except that Congress necessarily dominates before a
call is issued and in the designation of the ratification method. 3
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming.
Christian Science Monitor, April 3, 1967, p. 9. In addition, California
and Rhode Island have expressed some dissatisfaction with the Baker
result so that, in effect, the required two-thirds of the state legislatures
have expressed some form of dissatisfaction with the existing state of
the law. However, dissatisfaction must be translated into a constitu-
tional form, which is the question here examined.
7. Alabama, California, Florida, Louisiana, Nevada, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and Utah.
8. See, e.g., Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Carolina.
9. See, e.g., Alabama, Florida, and North Dakota.
10. Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798). Neither
has the Vice-President, even though he is the President of the Senate.
See also Pierce Butler in the United States Senate on November 23, 1803,
3 FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF T=m FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 400 (1911)
[hereinafter cited FAmAND, RECORDS].
11. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
12. The major question implicit here, and throughout this paper,
is the extent to which federal law will control the freedom of the states
to act under article V.
13. See U.S. CoNsT. art. V; Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
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Hence, while the federal government may be somewhat by-
passed14 through state application and ratification, the states are
always indispensable in the amending process.
III. THE STATE LEGISLATURE'S ROLE
A. THE NATURE AND COiPOSITION OF AN APPLYING LEGISLATURE
The Supreme Court, in Leser v. Garnett, 5 held that amend-
ment ratification by the state legislature is "a Federal function
derived from the Federal Constitution" and "transcends any
limitations sought to be imposed by the people of the state."' 6
However, it is generally recognized that the state legislature's
composition is the state's own affair, except where a constitu-
tional right may be involved.' 7 For example, this view does not
14. This bypassing involves the substantive content of a proposed
amendment. Of course, procedures with respect to the call, etc., are
initially within the federal jurisdiction. In the political theory of 1787,
this procedure would make a nonresponsive federal body subject to the
will of the people, although both of the bodies involved are representa-
tives of the same people and should therefore reflect their desires. How-
ever, the federal-state type of governmental division, with its states'
rights coloration and the fear of a sprawling gargantua, may conceivably
also be found here, e.g., congressmen are federal, not local, officers. See
Preston v. Edmondson, 263 F. Supp. 370, 372-73 (N.D. Okla. 1967). At
the same time, state legislators are local officers. Since ratification is
always a local function, and the local bodies are given a means of pro-
posing amendments equal to the federal power, does this indicate a
desired ultimate supremacy on the local level?
15. 258 U.S. 130 (1922). Leser involved the nineteenth amend-
ment's extension of the vote to women. Two of several objections were:
(1) the character of the amendment required a state's affirmative con-
sent (Maryland's legislature had refused to ratify it), which the Court
rejected; and (2) several of the state constitutions had specific provi-
sions which rendered inoperative the ratifications by their legislatures,
i.e., they were without power to do so. The argument involved the
states' bill of rights which allegedly forbade the legislatures "to impair
[the people's] right of self-government," and also Tennessee's provision
forbidding the legislature to ratify any federal amendment proposed
subsequent to their election. Justice Brandeis disposed of this summar-
ily by stating that the Tennessee (and West Virginia) legislatures "had
power to adopt the resolutions of ratification" (in effect refusing to go
into a fact question that in West Virginia a first vote had rejected the
proposal, and the second vote of ratification was unlawful under the
state law), and that their "official notice to the Secretary, [of State],
duly authenticated, that they had done so was conclusive upon him, and,
being certified to by his proclamation, is conclusive upon the courts." Id.
at 137. Cf. FoRKoscH, CONS=nrUTIONAL LAW 60-61 (1963).
16. 258 U.S. at 137.
17. E.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Bond v. Floyd, 251 F.
Supp. 333 (N.D. Ga.), rev'd, 87 S.Ct. 339 (1966) (criticism of government
protected by first amendment and not grounds for refusing to seat duly
elected representative).
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authorize or justify federal intrusion into the bicameral or uni-
cameral' nature of the applying legislature. A single-bodied
legislature is just as effective for purposes of ratification and,
pari passu, application for a Constitutional Convention, as is a
double body.
However, in light of Baker v. Carr9 and the cases following
it, the question might arise whether a particular state legisla-
ture, at the time of its application, is a duly elected and valid
body for purposes of the second alternative. It is submitted
that this issue, subject to the exceptions herein noted, is pecul-
iarly one of state law. Recognizing that a state legislature may
now be under a legal obligation to reapportion, it does not follow
that the legislature may not act until reapportionment is ef-
fectuated, or that if it does act all statutes, resolutions, and "ap-
plications" are subject to a later declaration of infirmity.
When the judicial determination of unconstitutional ap-
portionment is subsequent to the questioned legislative action,
the formalistic and logical ab initio argument 20 is either com-
pletely erroneous 21 or must be substantially qualified.2 2 A re-
ductio ad absurdum argument is possible if ratification and not
application is examined. Since the twenty-third amendment was
18. Presently, Nebraska has a unicameral legislature. NEB. CONST.
art. III, § 1.
19. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
20. See, e.g., Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886),
where it was held that "an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers
no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never
been passed."
21. See, e.g., 39 Ops. ATr'y GEN. 22 (1937), advising the President
that the Supreme Court's 1937 overruling of a 1923 decision meant that
the congressional statute originally declared unconstitutional is now a
valid act because the "statute continues to remain on the statute books"
notwithstanding the 1923 declaration of unconstitutionality and may
therefore now "be administered in accordance with its terms."
22. In Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S.
371, 374 (1940), the court stated:
The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination
[of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have con-
sequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of
the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be consid-
ered in various aspects-with respect to particular relations,
individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and
official .... [I]t is manifest . . . that an all-inclusive state-
ment of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot bejustified.
See also Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 26 (1956), where Justice Frank-
furter concluded that "adjudication is not a mechanical exercise nor
does it compel 'either/or' determinations."
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finally ratified just one year prior to the Baker case, it is likely
that the Tennessee legislature was unconstitutionally apportioned
at the time. Further, it is reasonable to assume that many
other legislatures were malapportioned when they ratified the
twenty-third amendment.23 Yet, is there any serious dispute
whether a United States citizen residing in the District of Colum-
bia is able to vote in a Presidential election?
It seems even clearer that when the legislature merely re-
quests a Convention rather than ratifies an amendment, an
objection to the application on the basis of unequal apportion-
ment will not be sustained. Moreover, such a contention over-
looks political and pragmatic considerations. Subsequent con-
stitutionally apportioned legislatures will be able to recall, re-
scind, or otherwise void the former applications, 24 for appar-
ently there is no restriction upon rescission as there seemingly
is with respect to ratification.25
B. THE MEcHAi-cs OF MAKING AN APPLICATION
Procedural details relating to the time, place, etc., of leg-
islative sessions in which an application for a Convention call
may be made are clearly within the state's discretion.26 While
a legislature may desire a special session for this purpose, it
seems that this matter could be handled during a general ses-
sion. The only real procedural question concerns the vote re-
quired to make an application. The answer will depend on the
form the application takes and what a particular state's consti-
23. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368
(1963), pointed to "at least 30 state legislatures [which] had been
challenged in state and federal courts, and, besides this one, 10 electoral
cases of one kind or another are already on this Court's docket." The
assumption is that at least one-quarter plus one of the states in 1960-61
were improperly apportioned when the twenty-third amendment was
proposed and ratified.
24. At least twenty-six of the thirty-two legislatures which have
applied for reconsideration of the Baker decision, were malappor-
tioned at the time of application. Twenty of these legislatures have
subsequently reapportioned, including Alabama, Nebraska, Maryland,
Minnesota, and Tennessee. The reapportioned Maryland legislature in
March, 1967, considered rescinding their communication and failed to
do so by only one vote. But consider the situation where there is a
continuing malapportionment or the reapportioned legislature is still
not constitutional and the legislature rescinds. What result?
25. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), as discussed in
FOROSCH, CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW 92-93 (1963).
26. See, e.g., Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), which holds
that the efficacy of the internal rejection-and-then-ratification proce-
dure by a legislature to be a political question.
19671 1057
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
tution, statutes, or legislative rules require. Presently, some ap-
plications can be made when supported by fifty-one per cent
of the legislature. Other legislatures, however, cannot apply
unless sixty-five per cent of their members favor such action.
Arguably, some uniformity should be sought.
Several state constitutions require a referendum before the
legislature may apply. This requirement has been held uncon-
stitutional for purposes of amendment ratification,2 7 but it need
not follow that for purposes of application the same result is
required. However, since the constitutional language makes it
clear that the legislatures have to make the applications, one
may predict that mandatory referenda will be frowned upon.
At the same time, if the legislature chooses to adopt a permissive
referendum procedure, it seemingly has not violated its consti-
tutional responsibility, for it must still make the ultimate deci-
sion to apply.2
8
Perhaps the most important question facing the legislatures
applying for a Convention call is the appropriate form for the
application. In the past, Congress has received, inter alia, "me-
morials, '2 9 "petitions," "resolutions," and "statutes."30 Are these
documents effective? Do they each manifest the same thing in
the present context? Historically, the term "application" was
adopted in its generic sense, albeit within the framework of
existing legal definitions. The Constitution's draftsmen, more-
over, did not indicate any desire that a technical construction be
27. In Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920), the Court condemned
the use of popular referenda during the ratification of the eighteenth and
nineteenth amendments. The rationale was that a federal function is
involved which "transcends any limitations sought to be imposed by
the people of a State." Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1922).
28. If the referendum is to be binding when discretionarily held, a
different problem would be presented, although here again the above
conclusion seems applicable. See Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
29. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1534 (2d ed. unabr.
1934) gives several definitions, one being "a statement of facts, addressed
to the government . . . often accompanied with a petition or remon-
strance." BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 1136 (4th ed. 1951) defines it as "a
document presented to a legislative body ... containing a petition . .. ."
30. In late 1964, the annual General Assembly of the States, spon-
sored by the Council of State Governments, published a model petition
which called upon Congress to convene a Constitutional Convention to
propose an amendment to permit one house of a state's legislature to
be apportioned on a basis other than population. This model, however,
has not been uniformly adopted. The model, in part, provided "The
Legislatures of the State of , pursuant to joint resolution
hereby makes Application to the Congress of the United States to call
a Convention for proposing amendments to the Constitution of the
United States."
[Vol. 51:10531058
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given to the term. Since the state executive may not veto the
application, because no law is being created,31 there is no reason
why a "joint resolution" should not qualify as a proper applica-
tion from the state legislature.3 2 The result would be analogous
to the use of a congressional Joint Resolution in proposing the
twenty-first amendment under the first alternative.33 In any
event, the ultimate decision concerning the appropriate form will
be made by Congress. While a uniform application form is de-
sirable, any communication substantially manifesting a legisla-
tive desire that such a convention be called should suffice.
While consideration has focused thus far on the form of the
application, several points concerning the substantive require-
ments should be noted. The prime question is what the appli-
cation must say. Clearly, it should express the legislature's
desire for a convention and should apply to Congress to call
such a body into existence. Further, there appears to be no
reason to require that the application be limited to one particular
amendment as article V speaks of "amendments."
Finally, the amending clause clearly provides that each ap-
plication must be made to Congress. There may be, however,
some question as to what the term "Congress" means in this con-
text. The Constitution creates "a Congress ... which shall con-
sist of a Senate and House .... "34 While joint sessions of Con-
31. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932), where a federal census
necessitated a loss of representation in the House of Representatives,
the legislature reapportioned but the governor vetoed, and the Supreme
Court upheld this gubernatorial participation in the lawmaking func-
tion, is distinguishable. The Court has refused to uphold a state legis-
lature's concurrent resolution increasing the number of representatives,
Koenig v. Flynn, 285 U.S. 375 (1932), or a bill decreasing them, Carroll
v. Becker, 285 U.S. 380 (1932), where not submitted to the governor as
required by their constitutions.
32. Recognizing that "legislature" has a particular meaning in ar-
ticle I, § 4, clause one of the Constitution, and the Governor may partici-
pate therein, it does not necessarily follow that such a construction must
be given in all cases. As Chief Justice Hughes wrote:
The use in the Federal Constitution of the same term in differ-
ent relations does not always imply the performance of the same
function. The legislature may act as an electoral body, as in
the choice of United States Senators under Article I, section 3,
prior to the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment. It may
act as a ratifying body, as in the case of proposed amendments
to the Constitution under Article V .... It may act as a
consenting body, as in relation to the acquisition of lands by the
United States under Article I, section 8, paragraph 17. Wherever
the term 'legislature' is used in the Constitution it is necessary
to consider the nature of the particular action in view....
Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 365-66 (1932).
33. See Hollingworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798).
34. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 1.
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gress are authorized by the Constitution, 35 delivery to these ses-
sions should not be required. The more realistic procedure would
be to recognize the applications as delivered when they are de-
posited with the presiding officer and the keeper of the records
of both Houses.
IV. CONGRESS' ROLE
A. THE APPROPRIATE TEST FOR PROPER APPLICATION
Since Congress determines whether a proper and valid rati-
fication has occurred, arguably it has a similar power with re-
spect to applications. The rationale is that some body must have
the power to decide such questions and, with judicial withdrawal
or impotence,36 Congress is the only body external to the in-
dividual states capable of making this determination. Bootstrap
validity to a state's application cannot be granted, even though
congressional power may be exercised unwisely, for in this latter
situation the state involved may easily reapply in a correct and
valid manner. A hodge-podge of conflicting and even peculiar
procedures is thus avoided, as a congressional determination in
one instance will provide a precedent for the rest of the states.
In construing applications against the language of article
V, the test appears to be whether the document substantially
manifests a legislature's desire that a Convention call be made.
Given that Congress will be the final arbiter, political rather
than legal considerations will be involved. It is opined that
when the basic political temper of thirty-four states is evi-
denced in slightly different fashions, as herein considered, Con-
gress will not be likely to nit-pick the applications. Rather, ap-
plications will be given liberal constructions. At the same time,
however, where an express limitation or requirement is set forth
in such an application, restricting the scope of the Convention's
authority, so that the application is inconsistent with the other
applications, the Judiciary Committees of both Houses will have
no choice but to ignore the document or, preferably, to reject and
return it to the state legislature with an adequate explanation.
Another consideration in determining whether a proper ap-
plication has been made is the timeliness of the application.
More particularly, is there any time limitation imposed by Con-
35. U.S. CoxsT. art. II, § 3.
36. Cf. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939). The Court held
that Congress, not the courts, is the body to determine whether a proper
ratification has been made, for the question is "political" rather than
"legal."
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gress or the Constitution within which the required number of
applications must be received? Several recent proposed amend-
ments have required that ratification must occur within seven
years to be effective.3 7 The child labor amendment, however,
contained no such limitation.3 Thirteen years later, it still had
not been ratified. In the interim there had been rejections, re-
fusals to ratify, ratifications, and even some states taking one
position and subsequently reversing it. In Coleman v. Miller,0
the Court considered a twelve year lapse of time in the Kansas
legislature's ratification. 40 Three Justices reasoned that "in the
absence of a limitation by the Congress, the Court can [not] and
should [not] decide what is a reasonable period within which
ratification may be had. . . [as] the questions they involve are
essentially political and not justiciable." 41 Four concurring Jus-
tices felt that even this holding was beyond the Court's power for
"undivided control of that [amending] process has been given
by the [Fifth] Article exclusively and completely to Congress. '42
By analogy, therefore, Congress has complete power to deter-
mine the reasonableness of the time within which the required
two-thirds of the legislatures must apply and, regardless of its
decision, no judicial relief is possible. However, if the ratifica-
tion period heretofore used for certain proposed amendments is
any criterion, there is support for the view that seven years be-
tween the first application by a legislature and that of the last
could and should be the standard. As with ratification, a seven
37. See the congressional proposals for the eighteenth, twentieth,
twenty-first, and twenty-second amendments.
38. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
39. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
40. As noted in Coleman, the Kansas Legislature had, inter alia,
rejected the amendment in 1925. Twelve years later the legislature
reversed its position and ratified the amendment. Id. at 435-36.
41. Id. at 452, 454.
42. Id. at 459. The two dissenters felt the Court should and could
decide that more than a reasonable time had elapsed. They quoted at
length from and based their dissent upon Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368,
375 (1921), although there a congressional requirement of 7 years for
ratification of the eighteenth amendment was met in a year and half.
Included in this quotation was:
[T]here is a fair implication [in article V] that [ratification]
must be sufficiently contemporaneous in that number [three-
quarters] of States to reflect the will of the people in all sec-
tions at relatively the same period, which of course ratification
scattered through a long series of years would not do. ..
Id. at 472. One may therefore conclude that Dillon v. Gloss has lost its
judicial gloss but, it is suggested, the policy may still be applicable
to applications because Congress, and not the judiciary, decides this
matter.
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year period for application would afford states, whose legisla-
tures do not meet annually, sufficient time to consider the pro-
posal adequately while allowing for local discussion. 43 Yet, such
a period would require that the necessary number of legisla-
tures must agree, somewhat contemporaneously, that such a con-
vention is necessary.
B. THE CoNvETIoN CALL--MADAoRY OR P ssmvE?
Assuming that the required number of state legislatures
make proper applications, the question arises whether the term
"shall," found in the second alternative, places a mandatory ob-
ligation on Congress to issue the convention call. To illustrate
the importance of this issue, one need only consider the 1929
communication from the Wisconsin legislature informing Con-
gress that with its own application more than two-thirds of
the state legislatures had submitted applications for a Constitu-
tional Convention (although on various subjects), that the con-
stitutional language was mandatory, and that Congress should
perform its duty.44 Congress failed to act or even acknowledge
the request. If, in disregard of support for a Constitutional Con-
vention, Congress ignores such applications, and the judiciary re-
fuses to exert jurisdiction because of the political nature of the
issues involved, then what value can the alternative have?
Further, "shall" has been interpreted by the judiciary as
meaning "may"45 or "must" depending on the particular context.
43. Of course these great debates are not a necessity, as the
"sleeper" applications-applications passed by one legislature and sub-
sequently reconsidered by the same legislature-seemingly indicate.
However, it does seem desirable to allow sufficient time for such dis-
cussion.
44. See Martig, Amending the Constitution-Article Five: The Key-
stone of the Arch, 35 MicH. L. REv. 1253, 1267, 1269, 1270 (1937), where
it is stated that since 1789 "at least thirty-six of the states have at one
time or another made application to Congress for a convention. .. "
Since the early applications concerned the later-ratified Bill of Rights,
these can be subtracted so that between 1833 and 1929 at least 32
requests were made. However, some of these may be time-condemned
and, after 1893 eleven of the thirty-three states applying were satisfied
when the seventeenth amendment was submitted and ratified.
45. Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366, 371 (1873) held that
"shall" in the context of article IV, § 2, clause 2 is not absolute and is
qualified by the requirements of the surrounding states. This decision
is surprising because earlier Congress had imposed a mandatory duty
upon the governors to deliver up fleeing criminals. 1 Stat. 302 (1793),
18 U.S.C. § 3182. See also Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66,
107 (1861) (federal statute imposed nonmandatory obligation on recal-
citrant official).
1062 [Vol. 51:1053
ALTERNATIVE AMENDING CLAUSE
If the former meaning is attributed to the amending provision, it
would result in the circumscription of the state legislature's role
in amending the Constitution.40 While the members of Congress
are subjected to some political pressure from their constituents,
this begs the question and is an unsatisfactory safeguard for
such a crucial matter.
The more reasonable construction, in view of the alternatives
in article V, is that Congress has a mandatory obligation to call
the Convention. Thus, Congress is relegated to a purely inter-
mediate role under the second alternative with no power to con-
sider the wisdom and necessity of a Convention call.
The 1787 Convention debates appear to sustain this con-
struction. Madison's Notes disclose that Morris of Pennsylvania,
when the amending article was being discussed just two weeks
before the Convention terminated, "suggested that the [national]
Legislature should be left at liberty [exclusively] 47 to call a con-
vention, whenever they please. The art: was agreed to nem: con:
[without contradiction]. ' '48 To that time the major proposals
reaching the Convention limited the institution of the amending
process to the state legislatures, with Congress required to fol-
low suit, i.e., it "shall call a Convention for that purpose" when
two-thirds of the state legislatures make "application" therefor.
49
Morris wanted to have only Congress "at liberty to call a con-
vention, whenever they please," 50 and the Pinckney Plan,5 1 with
46. This was the fear expressed by Mason on September 17, 1787
when he successfully moved the amendment of the proposed article.
This stifling of the people's will could be done, for example, in the
Senate by a minority of the members where they constitute a majority
of a minimum quorum to transact business or where they engage in a
filibuster.
47. Mason gives this account of what transpired:
Anecdote. the constn as agreed at first was that amendments
might be proposed either by Congr. or the legislatures a commee
was appointed to digest & redraw. Gov. Morris & King were of
the commee. one morng. Gov. M. moved an instrn for certain
alterns (not 1/2 the members yet come in) in a hurry & without
understanding it was agreed to. the Commee reported so that
Congr. shd have the exclusve. power of proposg. amendmts.
G. Mason observd it on the report & opposed it. King denied
the constrn. Mason demonstrated it, & asked the Commee by
what authority they had varied what had been agreed. G.
Morris then impudently got up & said by authority of the con-
vention & produced the blind instruction beforementd. which
was unknown by "A of the house & not till then understood by
the other, they then restored it as it stood originally.
3 FARRAND, RECORDS 367-68.
48. 2 FAim, REcoRDs 468.
49. Id. at 467, n.23.
50. See note 48 supra and accompanying text. It is susceptible to
the intrepretation that "also" may be inserted between "Legislature"
1967] 1063
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both alternative methods utilized, seemed to have been ignored.
However, one week before the delegates terminated their labors
both Gerry of Massachusetts and Hamilton of New York con-
tended that the inability of Congress to propose amendments
was a defect too great to be permitted,52 whereupon a motion to
reconsider was passed. Madison, seconded by Hamilton, suc-
cessfully moved a new proposal 3 which modified the desires of
Morris slightly. The original major plans and suggestions placed
the proposing power exclusively in the hands of the states, (the
Virginia Plan specified "that the assent of the National Legisla-
ture ought not be required,")5 4 so that the states' application
required Congress to call an amending convention. Madison and
Hamilton wanted to permit only the Congress itself to propose
amendments, without any convention, but such proposals were
to be made either when both legislative bodies so desired or when
the states applied to Congress to propose an amendment. De-
spite early fears that the Congress may abuse its power,50 the
and "should." If this is the intrepretation then Morris, in effect, was
adopting a modified version of the Pinckney alternatives. See note 51
infra. The text intrepretation is utilized, although even with this alter-
native intrepretation the same conclusions would result.
51. The Pinckney Plan provided:
If Two Thirds of the Legislatures of the States apply for the
same The Legislature of the United States shall call a Conven-
tion for the purpose of amending the Constitution-Or should
Congress with the Consent of Two thirds of each house pro-
pose to the States amendments to the same-the agreement of
Two Thirds of the Legislatures of the States shall be sufficient
to make the said amendments Parts of the Constitution.
3 FAnRAim, RECORDS 601.
52. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS 557-59.
53. Ibid. The Madison proposal was that the Congress "whenever
two thirds of both Houses shall deem necessary, or on the application
of two thirds of the Legislatures of the several States, shall propose
amendments. .. ."
54. 1 FARRAND, RECORDS 22.
55. "13. Resd. that provision ought to be made for the amendment
of the Articles of Union whensoever it shall seem necessary, and that
the assent of the National Legislature ought not to be required thereto."
1 FAPRAND, RECORDS 22. For Randolph's additional views on why article
V may not be a sufficient protection against the Constitution's imper-
fections, see his letter to the Speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates
on Oct. 10, 1787. 3 FARRAN, RECORDS 126-27.
The first discussion by the Convention (as a Committee of the
Whole House) of this proposal discloses that "several members did not
see the necessity of the [entire] Resolution at all, nor the propriety
of making the consent of the Natl. Lagisl. unnecessary." 1 FAuuAw,
RECORDS 202. Mason urged the necessity of the Resolution. Concerning
the role of the federal legislature, he felt:
It would be improper to require the consent of the Natl. Legis-
lature, because they may abuse their power, and refuse their
consent on that very account. The opportunity for such an
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Madison-Hamilton language was retained until the last day of
the Convention's labors, but the new and additional fears ex-
pressed by Mason and others resulted in the language now
found in the Constitution.56
It may be remarked that Hamilton, in seconding Madison's
proposal, was playing a somewhat foxy game. He did not like
the Virginia Plan which expressly placed the amending power
out of reach of the federal government, but he did not care
(dare?) to make a direct assault upon it. His objections stressed
the contention that state amending power would be exercised
only to increase the states' powers, whereas the Congress would
be the first to perceive and would be most sensitive to the need
for amendment on behalf of the new federal Union; therefore,
this federal body "ought also to be empowered ... to call a Con-
vention- There could be no danger in giving this power, as the
people would finally decide in the case. '57 In other words he
would merely add to the pending proposal a second method and
body able to call a Convention. Madison's proposal, however,
went even beyond Hamilton's desires and the latter, therefore,
enthusiastically and quickly seconded it, utilizing Madison's re-
spect and influence amongst the delegates to attain a stronger
central government. But, it must be concluded, that when Ham-
ilton's new plan eventually failed, he willingly settled for what
still was more than he had suggested. If Congress now could
itself propose, without the states, then the states, without the
Congress (save for the ministerial call) could have a Convention
called for "proposing" new amendments.
This background of conflicting plans, the apparent compro-
mise at the last moment, and the language ultimately adopted,
suggests that the draftsmen's intent was that Congress should
be able to propose amendments directly and that the states
should be able to accomplish the same indirectly. Therefore,
unless one does violence to the legislative history, it is clear that
abuse, may be the fault of the Constitution calling for amend-
ment.
1 FARRAND, REcoRDs 203. Randolph "enforced" these arguments, and the
final clause, i.e., without the consent of the Congress, was postponed,
while the first provision was passed. 1 FARBAND, REcoRDs 202-04. Even-
tually, of course, this final clause was deleted, other changes made, and
Congress given independent power to propose.
On June 19th the Committee of the Whole House, by a 7-3 vote of
the states, decided not to agree to the Jersey propositions but to report
those offered by Mr. Randolph. 1 FAmnAND, REcoRDs 313.
56. See, e.g., the language of the Pinckney Plan, note 51 supra.
57. 2 FARuuAw, REcoRDs 558 (Emphasis added).
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the term "shall" in the present context imposes a mandatory ob-
ligation on Congress to call a proposing Convention when two-
thirds of the state legislatures properly apply.58
Even under the above construction, there is a problem of
enforcement should Congress choose to ignore proper and suf-
ficient applications. Arguably, legal recourse is available. The
federal judiciary might conceivably take the position that it has
jurisdiction to interpret the term "application." It is highly un-
likely, however, that the courts would become so involved, let
alone attempt to force Congress by a writ of mandamus or other-
wise to issue such a call. However, the states may be able to
achieve the necessary action by applying political pressure. Were
two-thirds of the state legislatures uniformly to move for a Con-
vention, it is politically unrealistic to expect that Congress would
ignore the matter. Additionally, personal communications from
58. Madison's contributions to the Federalist, number forty-three,
is the only one of the eighty-five papers that significantly mentions the
amending article. In the eighth subdivision only one paragraph is
found on this power. The fifth sentence reads: "It, moreover, equally
enables the general and the State governments to originate the amend-
ment of errors, as they may be pointed out by the experience on one
side, or on the other ......
In the First Congress Madison, on May 4, 1789, gave notice "that
he intended to bring on the subject of amendments" so as to comply with
the (implied) promises to the ratifying conventions that a Bill of Rights
would be added to the Constitution. :1 ANAs 247 (Gales ed. 1834).
[This is discussed in greater detail in Forkosch, Who Are the "People"
in the Preamble to the Constitution?, 51 WEST REs. L. REv. - (1967).]
The next day Bland (Va.) presented an application by that state's legis-
lature for amendments, attempting thereby to follow the alternative
amending procedures. Objections were made to its consideration until
the proper number of states "concurred in similar applications," and
Madison also "doubted the propriety of" the procedures:
until two-thirds of the State Legislatures concurred in such
application, and then it is out of the power of Congress to de-
cline complying, the words of the Constitution being express
and positive relative to the agency Congress may have in case of
applications of this nature .... From... [the Fifth (Amend-
ing) Article's language] it must appear, that Congress have no
deliberative power on this occasion ....
Therefore, he suggested the Virginia application be entered on the House
minutes and remain on file until the proper number of "similar appli-
cations" arrive. The objecting member agreed with these views but
the introducing member, Bland, while agreeing that Congress was
"obliged to order the convention when" the proper number of legislatures
applied, still felt that as the present application contained "a number of
reasons why it is necessary to call a convention," these reasons should
"be properly weighed" now in a Committee. A few others discussed
this briefly and one member suggested the applications be placed in the
minutes and wait for others, the original to be deposited in the archives;
to this Bland agreed. Ibid. at 249-251.
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constituents and state legislators should sufficiently motivate any
Congressmen interested in re-election. Beyond this, unfortun-
ately, Congress may be free to ignore its obligation if it so
chooses. This, perhaps, is the most important defect in the
amending provision.
C. THE MEcHAqiCS OF A CONVENTION CALL
Assuming that the necessary two-thirds of the states satisfy
the above requirements, how does Congress call a Convention?
It seems that a Joint Resolution, analogous to the one employed
for the ratification of the twenty-first amendment, should be
sufficient. Moreover, a simple majority of each House should be
able to pass such a resolution, as the two-thirds requirement ap-
plies only to the state legislatures' applications. This is proper
since Congress' function is procedural, and a majority vote should
be sufficient to determine how the call is to be worded.
Further, a congressional "call" implies that Congress will do
more than inform the states that the requisite number of ap-
plications has been received. The importance of this call must
not be overlooked. It becomes the guideline for all procedures
up to the time of the Convention and, to an extent, is the juris-
dictional support for that body. It is, therefore, essential that
the call be drafted with care and foresight. The Congress may,
of course, delegate some of the procedural matters to the states
as it did with respect to ratification of the twenty-first amend-
ment. 9 In any event, the call should make clear who has the
power to establish procedures.
V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
Assuming that Congress issues a call, it is fairly well es-
tablished that each state need not affirmatively respond. His-
torical support for this proposition is found in the 1787 Con-
vention.60 There Rhode Island refused to participate or even
sign the proposed Constitution, and it did not ratify until more
than a year after the required ninth state had so done.6 1 Simi-
59. Compare Lincoln, Ratification by Conventions, 18 MAss. L. Q.
287 (1933) (contending for exclusive state power), with Comment, Rat-
ification of Constitutional Amendment by State Conventions, 2 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 216 (1934) (contending for congressional power).
60. The Journal of the Convention discloses that "sundry Depu-
ties ... appeared .... " 1 FAmnzm, RECORDS 1.
61. On May 29, 1790. The required ninth state had ratified on
June 21, 1788, followed by Virginia (June 25) and New York (July 26).
19671 1067
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
larly, not all states have ratified all proposed and adopted
amendments. Still others have rescinded prior ratifications. "
It would, therefore, appear that a state may not only refuse to
support the Convention but, judicially, no method exists to com-
pel participation.63
A. SELECTION OF CONVENTION DELEGATES
The amending provision is silent on the method of choosing
delegates to the Convention. It seems clear that even if Congress
has the authority to designate a method of selection, such deci-
sions should be left to the respective states. It is further sub-
mtted that a special election, totally unconnected with any other
issues, should be held in each state to select the delegates.6 4
Such elections should take place no less than thirty days after
the final nomination of delegates so as to allow adequate local
discussion. This approach is clearly consistent with the tradi-
tion, political theory, and spirit of ar ticle V.
The qualifications of the voters in such a special election
should present little difficulty. Congress could either establish
the necessary requirements or delegate this power to the states.
Although the Constitution 65 permits Congress to alter regula-
tions (except as to the places of choosing Senators) adopted by
the states for national elections, it has not exercised this power.
It would seem unlikely that Congress would now attempt to exer-
cise such powers under the alternative amending clause. And
since the voters "in each state shall have the qualifications
requisite for [voters] of the most numerous branch of the state
legislature," state law may be employed to define these qualifi-
cations. 66
62. E.g., New Jersey, Ohio, and Oregon later rescinded their rat-
ifications of the fourteenth amendment.
63. While the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court permits a
recusant state to be sued, and procedurally a suit is therefore feasible,
the substantive cause of action remains unclear regardless of whether
the Court would undertake to pass upon the question. Carried to an
extreme, suppose not one or two states so refrained but one more than
one-third, so that there would be an insufficiency if two-thirds of the
states were required to propose under article V.
64. The importance of the Convention and its work suggest a spe-
cial election. Where ratifying conventions were used for the twenty-first
amendment, the delegates were elected.
65. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 4, cl. 1.
66. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1; see Brudlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S.
277 (1937); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874). The
right to vote is itself a federal constitutional one, United States v. Clas-
sic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
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The amending provision does not cover expressly or im-
plicitly qualifications and requirements for other delegates to a
Constitutional Convention or delegates to a ratifying convention.
Thus, a degree of parallel interpretation may be used, and the
method and manner of qualifying delegates for a ratifying con-
vention may be drawn upon by analogy.
The initial question is whether Congress has the power to
prescribe qualifications for the Convention delegates. The Con-
stitution's silence allows one to argue that by omitting qualifying
language the 1787 Convention intended to give Congress such a
discretionary substantive power.6 7 This position finds some sup-
port in the composition and qualifications of the delegates to the
1787 Constitutional Convention.8 The call by Congress for the
original Convention was simply for "delegates who shall have
been appointed by the several states."'6 9 This call, in effect,
permits the inference that Congress could have specified the
necessary requirements but chose to leave the matter with the
states.7 0
Further support for this position is found in the fact that
Constitutional Conventions are a federal function. Since ratify-
ing legislators, when Congress chooses this mode, engage in a
federal function,7'1 a proposing Convention and its delegates, by
parity of reasoning, should be similarly viewed as engaging in a
Thus, all applicable federal constitutional and statutory limitations upon
the states, and rights of persons would apply; e.g., the Voting Rights Act
of 1965, 79 Stat. 437, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 and the Civil Rights Acts of 1957,
1960, and 1964. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1343; 18 U.S.C. § 241.
67. This finds support in the February 21, 1787, call by Congress
for a convention "of delegates who shall have been appointed by the
several states" implying that the qualifications might have been stated
but were being left up to the states. 3 FARRAND, RECORDS 13-14.
68. For example, while there were only four delegates under thirty,
namely, Dayton (27, N.J.), Mercer (28, Md.), Pinckney (29, S.C.), and
Spaight (29, N.C.), there were fifteen in their thirties. Franklin, at
eighty-one, was the elder of the Convention. The average age of the
delegates was 42. Whether or not the qualifications for a future Sena-
tor included the attainment of the age of thirty because of the large
number above that age, or shortly to meet it, is conjectural; but the fact
that the age for the House was set at twenty-five, when only Dayton
(a nonentity) was, for practical purposes, then ineligible for the Senate,
suggests that the preponderance of young men in the Convention pre-
disposed youthful qualifications.
69. 3 FARRAND, RECORDS 14.
70. For example, at the New York Convention ratifying the twenty-
first amendment, the qualifications for the convention delegates were
silent as to age. This was not astonishing as the state constitution omits
any requirement of age as a qualification for the state legislature.
71. See notes 27, 31 supra.
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federal function. Either by analogy to the preceding conclusions,
or because Congress issues the call, or because the process results
in one national convention, as opposed to fifty local ones, a
federal function is clearly involved in the second alternative.
While it would appear that Congress has the power to es-
tablish the qualifications for future Convention delegates, prac-
tical political considerations make it unlikely that this power will
be exercised. It is far more consistent with a politician's be-
havioral pattern for him to follow a parallel method, where none
else is available, than to blaze new trails. Once a precedent is
established, the procedure is thereafter continued save where
substantial defects are disclosed. Accordingly, common sense and
political considerations conduce to the suggestions hereafter
made.
Assuming, therefore, that Congress directs that the dele-
gates to the proposing Convention be selected locally, the ques-
tion becomes what probable substantive qualifications must the
delegates satisfy? The experience under the twenty-first amend-
ment's ratifying conventions should supply part of the answer.
There, a congressional Joint Resolution 72 was deposited in the
Department of State calling for ratifying conventions, and the
state legislatures were promptly notified. The legislatures then
passed statutes calling for a "state convention" to be held at a
specified time, place, and hour "to consider and act upon the
ratification of the proposal. '73 In other words, a procedure had
to be improvised, and, to allay any objection, the legislature
carefully established procedures consistent with those used in
the state functions. The New York statute, for example, provided
that one hundred fifty delegates to the Convention were
to be elected from the state at large, each of whom shall be a
citizen and inhabitant of the state .... A person qualified at
the time of such election to vote ... for a member of assembly
[the lower or more popular body] . . . shall be qualified ....
Statutes disqualifying a person for public office because he then
holds another public office shall not apply. . . .74
72. 47 Stat. 1625 (1933).
73. See, e.g., N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1933, ch. 143, pp. 525-33.
74. Id. at § 2. There was no primary election but nominations were
to be by petition, which was then described (§ 3); election details, bal-
lot sample, etc., were then set forth in §J 4-7; other provisions led up to
the convention itself, with delegates to "take the constitutional oath of
office" and to be called to order by the governor or lieutenant governor
acting as temporary president (Q 10); the "convention shall be the judge
of the election and qualification of its members . . ." enact its own rules,
elect officers, etc. (Q 11); ratification was to be by "a majority of the
total number of delegates" and a certificate, in triplicate, by the con-
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The election and convention were duly held and the amendment
was ratified without any objection as to the procedural matters.
It should be noted that delegates did not have to possess the
same qualifications as a congressman or a senator. Rather, citi-
zenship and inhabitancy were the only requirements. 75
By analogy, delegates to a proposing Convention should not
have to satisfy constitutional requirements imposed upon sena-
tors or congressmen. Two factors, however, seem to militate
against this conclusion. The Constitution permits ratification by
state legislatures or state conventions, and no great violence is
done to this language if such legislators or delegates, chosen
locally, satisfy local qualifications. But with respect to proposing
Conventions, it is a national legislature or convention which is
involved, and it would appear that the states are, therefore,
completely proscribed from any substantive intrusion.76 This
vention's president and secretary was to be deposited with the state's
secretary who would transmit one each to the United States Secretary
of State, to the Senate's presiding officer, and to the House's presiding
officer "in the manner in which amendments to the Constitution of the
United States, submitted to the legislature for ratification are certified
.... " (§ 12). It may be noted that such notice of ratification to the
Secretary of State was held to be binding upon him and, when certified
by his own proclamation, conclusive upon the courts. See Leser v.
Garnett 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1920). This ministerial function has been
transferred to the administrator of General Services, 65 Stat. 710-11
(1951), 1 U.S.C. § 112 (1964).
75. Of course, state requirements for its lower house applied, but
this was by choice
76. Are the states proscribed from determining substantive quali-
fications unless and until Congress affirmatively so permits? Or may
the states act, assuming Congress fails so to do, unless and until Con-
gress prevents them from so doing? These usual proscription-pre-
emption doctrines briefly state that where the subject-matter involved
is national in character and requires national uniform legislation the
states are proscribed from action, assuming they can act otherwise (e.g.,
constitutionally they cannot declare war in any conceivable situation),
unless and until Congress permits it. See, e.g., Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S.
100 (1890); In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891). However, where such
character and uniformity are not found, and assuming the states can
otherwise act, the states may do so unless Congress either denies state
action, even though it does not itself act, or acts thereon and thereby
preempts the subject-matter. Congress may specifically permit the
states to act until federal legislation is enacted, as in Cooley v. Board
of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
In the instant situation it would appear that the substantive qual-
ifications of proposing delegates is very definitely a national matter
requiring uniformity, and thus precluding state action. But does this
proscription mean that Congress may affirmatively permit the states,
when Congress issues the Convention call, to set any substantive qual-
ifications? Proscription has a coin-face, namely, that in certain instances
the states can never act, and Congress has no authority to delegate any
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means that Congress, in its Convention call, must set the qualifi-
cations, because the states, lacking this power, either cannot hold
elections or must attempt to utilize some undefined minimum.7
In such a call it is simple for Congress to follow the Constitu-
tion's qualifications for the House of Representatives and re-
quire that delegates be at least twenty-five years of age, a United
States citizen for at least seven years, and an inhabitant of the
state from which he was chosen.78 Of course, the good sense of
the voters may be urged as a sufficient safeguard against un-
qualified candidates, but this is a rather slim reed upon which to
build a Convention empowered to alter our constitutional frame-
work.
A separate question is whether any limitations are imposed
by the Constitution precluding otherwise qualified candidates
from becoming Convention delegates. For example, article I,
section six, clause two, states that Congressmen shall not "be
appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United
States" created, or having its emoluments increased, "during the
time for which he was elected." The key words in this article
are "appointed" and "civil office." Since the delegates are
elected, no reason should be found in this clause to preclude
members of Congress from being delegates. Further, the dele-
gates do not hold a "civil office." Although a federal function
is involved, the delegates are more like legislators than civil
servants. Clearly, the original clause sought to prevent corrup-
tion79 that would ruin government by conflicts of interest and
patronism.8 0 Arguably, the Constitutional Convention does
such power, e.g., to declare war. It is suggested this aspect of proscrip-
tion be applied in the instant situation.
77. Although not further discussed, it would be simple for the
states, if the Congressional call omits the suggested clause, to follow
the constitutional requirements for the House of Representatives, where-
upon, it is opined, the Supreme Court will find it difficult to hold that
Congress intended otherwise.
78. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 2, & § 3, cl. 3. The call might sim-
ply state that "Delegates are to possess the qualifications required of a
member of the House of Representatives of the United States at the
time of their elections [convening]." The bracketed choice is analogized
to the situation when Senator Rush D. Holt was elected before reaching
the minimum age of thirty but waited to take the oath of office until
reaching the required age. S. REP. No. 904, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935),
79 CoxG. REc. 9651-653 (1935).
One might even suggest Senatorial years as the minimum, and not
be too far out of line with the 1787 Convention, see note 68 supra.
79. Rutledge also used this term, 1 FARRA D, RECORDS 386, as did
others, e.g., Martin (reporting to the Maryland Legislature Nov. 29,
1787), 3 FARRAND, REcoRDs 201.
80. See 1 FAREAND, REcosS 376, where Butler spoke of the exper-
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not come within this fear, for betterment by conflicts of inter-
est should result from participation. Moreover, in light of the
delegates' function and possible impact on the constitutional
scheme, it seems desirable that interested members of Congress
be allowed to participate. Finally, the fact that some of the
delegates to the 1787 Convention were legislators under the Arti-
cles of Confederation should create a significant precedent in
favor of congressmen's eligibility.8 1
Similarly, it should be noted that nothing in the Constitu-
tion or the legislative history precludes members of the federal
judiciary8 2 from being Convention delegates. Seemingly, argu-
ments favoring the eligibility of congressmen are equally per-
suasive in this context. It is suggested, however, that federal
judges should refrain from becoming delegates. In fact, Con-
gress may be wise to exclude the judiciary expressly in the
call and in its regulation of federal courts.83 This conclusion is
based on policy considerations, rather than dictated by consti-
tutional law. The rationale is that a proposing Convention is
distinguishable from a ratifying convention in purpose and in
function, and that the Convention may desire to reverse judicial
decisions, with resulting embarrassment, conflicts of interest,
and a possibility that discussion will be inhibited or restricted
if the federal judiciary is present.
The final question in the selection of delegates involves
the total number to be selected and their apportionment among
the states. The 1787 Constitutional Convention consisted of sev-
ience in Great Britain; Mason also spoke of this, 1 FARRAxD, RECORDS 387.
Martin, supra note 79, was still more caustic.
81. If the precedent of ratifying conventions is applicable, then
either all those conventions having federal legislators are (perhaps)
void and the twenty-first amendment has not been duly ratified, or
else such an interpretation was never given or was rejected. See, e.g.,
note 74, supra where the New York ratifying convention stated the non-
application of disqualifying statutes. In the current New York Consti-
tutional Convention (for New York's own constitution) meeting during
1967, there are included as members forty-one present or former legis-
lators. Present legislators occupy all the important majority and minor-
ity positions. Any conflicting federal statutes could easily be removed
from application temporarily.
82. The question whether administrative bodies, whose members
at times exercise quasi-judicial power, are subsumed under the article III
language must be answered in the negative, for decisions to the con-
trary are legion. See, e.g., FoRKoscH, ADwmqisTRATIV LAw § 43 (1956).
New York's current convention has several former and present judges
serving on committees.
83. An objection as to its application to current judges may be
made but, it is opined, even if such a statute may be so questioned,
judges will undoubtedly not avail themselves of this possible flaw.
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enty-four appointed delegates, but only fifty-five ever attended.
Moreover, as a result of absentees and abstentions only thirty-
nine signed the final proposal.8 4 This example, however, should
not be adopted as controlling precedent. The ideal Convention
must not prove unwieldy but must at the same time fairly repre-
sent the people in order to be consistent with its nature and
purpose. It is submitted that the number of delegates called
for by Congress should equal the number of congressmen as es-
tablished by the Constitution-presently five hundred and thir-
ty-eight-and a sufficient number of alternates so that full rep-
resentation throughout the convention can be guaranteed. By
allowing each person to vote for one delegate from his congres-
sional district (or at-large as may now be required) plus two
delegates at-large in the state (by analogy to senators), this
number could easily be selected.8 5
B. TI CoNvmNTioN'S AuTHoRrr
The function of the Convention, as expressly stated in arti-
cle V, is to propose constitutional amendments. The question
remains, however, whether there are any limitations upon the
power or scope of the Convention to propose such amendments.
Article V, for example, contains the proviso "that no State,
without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in
the Senate." Since the amending article was incorporated to
overcome the inability of the states to amend the Articles of
Confederation, and since the Great Compromise gave the smaller
states equal senatorial representation, this express language
clearly means that there can be no amendment depriving any
objecting state of its equal senatorial suffrage.80 Similarly, arti-
84. FoRKoscE, CoNsTrrTmIoNAL LAW 5 (1963).
85. Alaska, in 1958, and Hawaii, in 1960, each elected one Repre-
sentative, raising the total to 437, with Hawaii thereafter (1962, 1964)
electing 2 (also at-large). Representative "at-large" seats are not dis-
cussed in any detail, on which see, e.g., U.S. BUREAu OF THE CENSUS, STA-
TISTICAL ABSTRACT OF UNITED STATES 379 (80th ed. 1965), for notes on sin-
gle and double seats through at-large elections. On the problem of
equitableness in such at-large seats see, e.g., HACKER, CONGRESSIONAL Dis-
TicnTiG 73, n.4 (1963).
86. See, e.g., 2 FARRAND, RECORDS 330-31. On September 15th, the
last day when the Convention debated the numerous proposals, this
proviso to article V was adopted in the identical language found there
today, with Madison's Notes stating: "This motion dictated by the cir-
culating murmurs of the small States was agreed to without debate, no
one opposing it, or on the question, saying no." See also Jonathan
Dayton's remarks in the Senate on November 24, 1803, given in 3 FAR-
RAND, RECORDS 400-01.
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cle IV, section three, clause one, empowers Congress to admit
new states:
but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Juris-
diction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junc-
tion of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Con-
sent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of
the Congress.
However, it appears that these limitations would also have been
incorporated 87 in article V if the desire of the Constitutional
Convention of 1787 was to prevent future amendment without
the consent of the state. While the quoted clause seeks to con-
tinue the territorial dignity and relative power of all states
vis-a-vis each other and in the federal-state relationship, the
only conclusion possible is that the only proviso constitutionally
protected from change by amendment is the one included in
article V.88
Constitutional limitations aside, article V gives both Con-
gress and the Convention authority to propose amendments.8 9
The enabling language in each alternative is identical save for
the infinitive-gerund distinction. The use of the plural "amend-
ments" in the second alternative indicates that the Convention
may propose as many amendments as it deems necessary and
that Congress is constitutionally unable to restrict this right.
87. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1, preventing Congress, be-
fore 1808, from prohibiting the importation of slaves, and id. cl. 4, con-
cerning taxes, which are repeated in article V's proviso.
88. See also Madison's views, note 58 supra, where the last two
sentences are:
The exception in favor of the equality of suffrage in the Senate,
was probably meant as a palladium to the residuary sovereignty
of the States, implied and secured by the principle of represen-
tation in one branch of the legislature; and was probably in-
sisted on by the States particularly attached to that equality.
The other exception must have been admitted on the same con-
siderations which produced the privilege defended by it.
The other proviso has lapsed because of its built in time limitation, i.e.,
no amendment prior to 1808 is to be made concerning the importation
of slaves, or permitting direct taxes except as there given. The thir-
teenth amendment, of course, additionally acts upon all those persons
covered by the first such item, and the sixteenth amendment has re-
placed the second.
89. The 1787 Convention is a true illustration of a runaway body.
It was called for a single purpose. 3 FARRAND, REcORDs 14. The Ran-
dolph-Patterson confrontation pointed up the clash between those who
desired to create a new government and those who desired to amend the
old. See, e.g., BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHm.ADELPHIA 104-08 (1966); FoRxoscH,
CONsTiTuTIoNAL LAW 5-7 (1963).
From this it may be concluded that any federal Constitutional Con-
vention has a precedent to enable it to propose any and all amendments,
save as otherwise constitutionally limited.
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Reference to the article's legislative history supports this con-
clusion.9° Throughout the chronological entirety of the Con-
vention's proposals, committee reports, debates, and re-formula-
tions, the assumption seeps through that amendments (plural)
were to be proposed by a Convention initially applied for by the
legislatures. Hamilton, Madison, and Mason, even though at
odds with respect to exact procedure, all consistently referred to
the Convention's power by using plurals. Thus, there can be
little doubt that the Constitution's draftsmen never intended
that article V be so narrowly construed as to limit the power of
the Constitutional Convention to propose more than one amend-
ment.
90. The Convention adjourned on July 26, 1787, referring its pro-
ceedings to a Committee of Detail, chaired by Rutledge of South Carolina
and including Wilson of Pennsylvania, see 1 FARRAND, RECORDS at xxii, to
report a proposed constitution on August 6th. FARRAND, RECORDS inserts,
between these dates, a nearly complete series of documents representing
the various stages of the work of the Committee. One of these states
that "This Constitution ought be be amended . . . and on the Applica-
tion of the Legislatures of two thirds of the States in the Union, the
Legislature of the United States shall call a Convention for that pur-
pose." [2 id., Document VIII, at 159. Farrand notes this is from a
document found among the Wilson papers]. From the chronological
background of this reference on July 26th it would appear that the
Virginia (Randolph) Plan, proposed on May 29th, influenced these com-
mittee views, although the amending portion of the Pinckney Plan, pro-
posed immediately after the Virginia one, seems eventually to have
carried the day. It is, however, notable that even this latter Plan's two
methods commenced with the convention and then, seemingly as an
inserted after-thought, included the Congress. Notwithstanding the
ultimate form, the Committee of Detail reported back a proposed con-
stitution which included language practically identical to the Virginia
proposal: "On the application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the
States in the Union, for an amendment of this Constitution, the Legis-
lature of the United States shall call a Convention for that purpose." 2
FARRAmD, RECORDS 188, 557.
The Convention proceeded to take up each of the proposed twenty-
three separate articles and it was not until August 30th that the nine-
teenth was reached. The Journal discloses that "On the question to
agree to the 19 article as reported it passed in the affirmative," but
Madison's Notes disclose that a suggestion by Morris was accepted. On
the 31st of August the entirety of the proceedings were referred to an
elected Committee of Eleven. On the following day and thereafter
Brearley reported partially each time on behalf of the Committee, and
the Convention debated the items so reported, but it was not until
September 10th that, on Gerry's motion to reconsider, the amending
proposal was taken up. Both Gerry and Hamilton felt that the proposal
then was deficient, though for different reasons, as did Madison. See
notes 47-74 supra and accompanying text, for an account of what then
occurred.
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This broad power in the Convention, and the absence of any-
thing contrary in the proposals, debates, or-the Constitution it-
self, also seem to indicate that no time limit is imposed upon
the Convention's ability to propose amendments. Thus, a "run-
away" Convention may ape the charge that the Supreme Court
is a continuing constitutional convention and, at least theoreti-
cally, could remain in session indefinitely. Even practical ob-
stacles, such as appropriations and places to meet, need not deter
the members from adjourning from month to month or year to
year. Apparently, no way out of this political dilemma exists,
for the judiciary cannot intervene, and the call cannot restrict.
As a practical matter this conjured fear is like the proverbial
straw man, albeit when the situation materializes it becomes
steel.01
C. VOTING REQUMEMENTS IN THE CONVENTION
Given the above, the Convention's efforts may, and theoreti-
cally should, result in proposals. By implication, neither the
Congress nor the judiciary has the power to supervise or review
the Convention's procedures. 2 Thus, once the Convention is con-
vened, it is free to establish any voting requirements, rules of
order, and other procedural framework it desires. For most
matters, a simple majority of a quorum should suffice. How-
ever, with respect to the method of voting, the Convention
should adopt the policy that each delegate may vote individually,
91. See, e.g., Holmes' comment in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208
(1927): "It is the usual last resort of constitutional arguments to point
out shortcomings of this sort. .. ."
92. Article V states the Convention is called "for proposing Amend-
ments," so that it appears that Congress has no degree of superintend-
ence, especially as it has its own separate power to propose. Neither
has the Supreme Court any power to review procedural or substantive
determinations.
The analogy is not to an "ordinary" statute or act of legislation by
Congress but to the political concepts inhering in such a body. For
example, the 1787 Convention was called "for the sole and express pur-
pose of revising the Articles of Confederation," but, as Madison phrased
it, "the absolute necessity of the case" permitted it to go beyond this
mandate. FoRxoscH, CoNsTrruTIONAL LAW 5-6 n.10 (1963). So, if the Su-
preme Court, for example, is able to examine procedure or sub-
stance, a constitutional convention becomes another congress and now
not only is subject to judicial review but has its endeavors treated as
statutes, not amending proposals. In this respect Justice Black's con-
curring language in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 456-60 (1939) (con-
curred in by Douglas, Frankfurter, and Roberts, J.J.), should apply
even more forcefully.
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not as part of a state or political party unit.93 Any other pro-
cedure would be contrary to the Constitution's spirit and legis-
lative history, for it would deprive the people of their funda-
mental right to propose amendments. If required, there are
appropriate analogies to the Congress and the ratifying conven-
tions for the twenty-first amendment, where the participating
representatives each cast a separate vote.
For the purpose of adopting amendment proposals, a voting
requirement analogous to the two-thirds of those entitled to
vote on such proposals in Congress and the state legislatures may
be appropriate even though such a requirement is not expressed
anywhere in the Constitution or its legislative history. Numer-
ous reasons may be advanced for the two-thirds requirement.
First, little justification can be found for lowering this figure
when such a vote is required of Congress to propose amend-
ments. Also, whatever the number of delegates selected, the
chances of combining politicking, emotionalism, bias, prejudice,
and other shortsighted subjective considerations to obtain a sim-
ple majority are too great to allow. The primary consideration,
therefore, should be our historical and political approach to such
an important vote and, accordingly, the Convention's rules should
require a two-thirds vote to propose an amendment.
VI. RATIFICATION OF THE CONVENTION'S PROPOSALS
Once the Convention has propcsed one or more constitu-
tional amendments the question of ratification becomes relevant.
The basic question is whether the Convention is to forward the
proposals to the states, or whether Congress is to intervene to
establish the mode of ratification. Both constitutionally and
practically, the solution is for the Convention to forward its
proposals to Congress and then dissolve, leaving Congress to
handle the ratification procedure. This conclusion stems from
language in article V which provides that amendments are valid
"when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the sev-
eral States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the
one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the
Congress .... ." Clearly, Congress has the sole power to de-
termine which alternative mode of ratification will be employed.
Moreover, article V seems to indicate that the Convention's
sole purpose is to propose amendments, for it is not mentioned
93. Any analogy to the 1787 Convention would be disastrous and
not in accord with the requirements of article V.
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in any other place. Thus, any mention of the mode of ratifi-
cation by such a Convention will be viewed as surplusage by
Congress, but such surplusage cannot be construed to render a
proposal invalid.9 4
It is further suggested that the original call should express
the mode of ratification, as the amendment proposals then
would not have to be returned to Congress except for mere
mechanical or procedural effectuation. A contrary procedure
would give Congress a superintending power to withhold sub-
mission if the proposed amendments did not conform to its de-
sires without fear of judicial interference. 5 Congress has its
own independent machinery to propose amendments in the first
alternative, and to give Congress the power to review the pro-
posals necessarily deprives the second alternative of its inde-
pendence. As a result, Congress would become supreme, and art-
icle V would automatically read that "The Congress . . . shall
call a [n advisory] Convention for proposing Amendments [to it]
... ." This would be an adoption of the very system rejected
by the 1787 Convention. Therefore, the best time and place to
make such a choice is in the call, and thereafter any further
congressional function should be extremely and strictly limited
to simple procedural duties.
While the method of selection is basically a policy con-
sideration, it is suggested that ratification by state legislatures
should be the mode selected by Congress in its call. The people
already have elected delegates to one proposing convention,
and having a second ratifying convention would be asking the
same people to approve their own handiwork. In theory there
should be two different bodies, one to check on the other; the
different sets of delegates to the Convention and to the state's
legislature may and should produce different reasons and ar-
94. See, e.g., United States v. Sprague, 262 U.S. 716, 732-33 (1931),
where the eighteenth amendment was attacked because of the tenth
amendment's distinction between powers reserved to the states and
those reserved to the people; the argument was that states could ratify
only their own reserved rights, but that only the conventions could
ratify the people's reserved rights; and, since the eighteenth amendment
involved the reserved rights of the people, the ratification by states'
legislatures was invalid. The Court unanimously rejected this conten-
tion: "This court has repeatedly and consistently declared that the
choice of mode rests solely in the discretion of Congress." Id. at 732.
The Court also stated that the people in adopting the original Constitu-
tion, "deliberately made the grant of power to Congress in respect to the
choice of the mode of ratification of amendments .... Congress must
[so] function as the delegated agent. . . ." Id. at 733.
95. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
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guments for so amending the Constitution. Expenses, time, ef-
fort, and difficulties, not only of the states but of their dele-
gates, would increase to a regressive point if a separate body
was again convened.
In proposing amendments in the past Congress has, in sev-
eral instances, placed a seven-year limitation for ratification by
the states. Does the Convention have such a power under the
alternative method or is it still in Congress, through the latter's
power to propose the mode of ratification? The amendments
which have been so limited have contained the language as a
separate section; it would appear that Congress has, by such
use, indicated its substantive nature. From this point of view
the Convention must have this power, but the counter-argument,
based upon Congress' ability to determine the mode of ratifica-
tion, may prove more persuasive. If a choice must be made, the
Convention's power to limit is here accepted, but there is no
reason why any difference or disagreement need develop. From
a policy approach, a seven-year limit is suggested for all amend-
ments proposed through the alternative method because other-
wise the judiciary may enter the pictuxe.9 6
Finally, upon receipt of the official notification of the pro-
posed amendments, the state should promptly begin the process
of ratification. Assuming this occurs, properly authenticated and
certificated copies of ratification should be promptly forwarded
to the appropriate official-the Administrator of General Serv-
icesY7 While the date of ratification by the last required state
is the operative date of an amendment, 98 a central federal
location for purposes of binding the United States and, when
"certified to by... proclamation, conclusive upon the courts,"'9 D
is advisable to obviate all objections as to regularity.
VII. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis permits the formulation of a sug-
gested procedure whereby the alternative method of amending
the Constitution may be effectuated. Criticism and counter-
suggestions may thus be provoked, hopefully with the result
that a useful uniform mode can be set before the state legis-
latures, the Congress, and the Supreme Court. Such a plan or
96. Ibid.
97. 65 Stat. 710-11 (1951), 1 U.S.C. § 112 (1964).
98. Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 376 (1921).
99. Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1922).
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procedure, it is submitted, should contain the following points.
First, the application by state legislatures should be by at
least majority vote for a (joint) resolution, not requiring a gov-
ernor's approval, and should be couched in the language sug-
gested: The Legislature of the State of , pursuant to
(Joint) Resolution, hereby makes application to the Congress of
the United States to call a Convention for proposing amend-
ments to the Constitution of the United States.
Second, in accordance with the states' own procedures, but
sufficient to qualify under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
for introduction as an exhibit in a federal district court trial,
such an application should be certified by the necessary and re-
quired officers as an official document of the state, and officially
forwarded in an appropriate manner to and filed with at least
the parliamentary officers of the House and the Senate. While
there is no constitutional need to file with the Secretary of
State, the Administrator of General Services, or any other offi-
cer, no harm can result therefrom. The forwarding language
might be: To the [officer, title, and description] of the United
States: Please be informed and take notice that the following
(Joint) Resolution was adopted by at least a majority of both
houses of the legislature of the State of on the ____ day
of ,19.-- , is properly certified as such in accordance
with all applicable laws, and is forwarded to you as an officer
of the Congress of the United States required to be notified so
that application to the said Congress is duly now made and com-
pleted: [set forth resolution, certification, etc., and conclude
entire notice with names, titles, etc., of the forwarding officials].
Third, the federal officials receiving such an application
should respond in an appropriate manner: To the [state's for-
warding official]. This will acknowledge receipt this day of your
notice dated the --- day of ,19__.
Fourth, when two-thirds of such, or analogous, applications
have been received, the persons so receiving them, and now
exercising a ministerial function, should forward all such ap-
plications to the Senate and House as per their own respective
internal procedures, assuming that the next paragraph does not
apply, notifying each body of the receipt and date of receipt of
each such application and, because of a possible lack of uni-
formity, perhaps also pointing this out, although this is not
strictly required as the forwarded applications will so indicate.
Fifth, depending upon the internal procedures of the two
Houses, provision should be had for automatically raising such
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applications on the floor of each body when the required num-
ber has been duly received, or else, if not so presented, then
when each House is notified.
Sixth, depending upon the internal procedures of the Senate
and House, such applications and notifications may possibly be
referred to the appropriate committees. After examination, °0
and if required, verification of the application, the Committee
should be required promptly to report back to its legislative body
with a proposed Joint' 0 ' Resolution 0 2 directing issuance of a
call for a Constitutional Convention.
Seventh, this combined Joint Resolution call must be de-
tailed, and may include an overall procedure to be followed to
the point where, as in an amending proposal by Congress itself,
the proposed amendment is forwarded to the states for ratifica-
tion and the notification by the states thereof. The proposed
call given below indicates details which may be utilized.
Eighth, a majority of each House is sufficient to pass such a
Joint Resolution call, official copies thereafter being sent to all
states as all other official notices and documents are sent.
Ninth, upon receipt of such official calls each state, in ac-
cordance with its official legislative procedures and machinery,
should enact the appropriate legislation for a special election of
delegates who, after the necessary formalties, should be certified
as such by the necessary state officials just as federal con-
gressmen are certified by them.103
100. This may include hearings, although no reason superficially
appears why these should ordinarily be necessary.
101. A Concurrent Resolution may be utilized and, in the sense that
one body may institute and adopt the procedures and the call in toto,
the analogy is to a bill enacted by the House or Senate independently
of the other body and then sent over. The form of the Resolution is a
political determination to be settled initially by the first Congress con-
fronted by the question and thereafter, perhaps, the precedent is estab-
lished. What is being suggested in the text makes for an earlier Reso-
lution and call.
102. Both committees may easily correlate their work on the details
of this Joint Resolution so as to obviate the necessity for a later confer-
ence to iron out differences in language, as there is nothing here of a
major substantive nature. However, if the respective committees do
not so cooperate, a conference must then so do and the Conference Re-
port will then be utilized; future such Joint Resolutions would then
have this as a precedent.
103. There is no provision made in article V concerning travel or
other personal expenses, payment for serving, etc., and, it is suggested
that these should all be provided for by the states. The costs of the
Convention itself should be defrayed by the federal government.
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Tenth, at the time and place called for, and under temporary
officers set forth in the call, the delegates should meet, approve
credentials, choose permanent officers, adopt their own rules,
propose amendments, debate, enact, and otherwise function in
accordance with the call.
Eleventh, a majority of the Convention delegates, assuming a
quorum present, should be sufficient to determine organiza-
tional and procedural rules and matters, but at least two-thirds
of those present and voting should be required to pass amend-
ments to be proposed for ratification.
Twelfth, the Convention should, as part of its organiza-
tional rules, provide that all proposed amendments be forwarded
to the appropriate congressional officials so designated for the
purpose of processing amendments proposed by Congress, and
also that a time limit of seven years be set within which the
proposals may be ratified. Moreover, the call by Congress should
contain appropriate parallel requirements.
Thirteenth, the mode of ratification being left to Congress,
the call should contain this choice and, as a matter of policy,
ratification should be by the state legislatures.
Fourteenth, the call should also contain a provision that
proper certificates of ratification are to be filed with the Ad-
ministrator of General Services, and that he, in turn, when the
required number of proper certificates is received by him, is to
make due proclamation thereof.
Finally, given the importance of the congressional call in
view of the role it plays with regard to substantive and pro-
cedural matters before and after the Convention, the following
is submitted as a form that may well be adopted by Congress:
A PROPOSED CALL BY CONGRESS
Whereas pursuant to article V of the Constitution of the
United States at least two-thirds of the Legislatures of the sev-
eral States of the United States have duly and validly made
proper and timely application to the Congress of the United
States to call a Convention for proposing amendments to the
said Constitution, namely, the States of... ; be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this
Joint Resolution be and be required to be considered as and
is a call, pursuant to article V of the Constitution of the United
States, for a Convention for proposing amendments to the said
Constitution as is more fully set forth hereafter.
Sec. 2. This Joint Resolution is directed to be duly for-
warded by the appropriate officers of both Houses of this Con-
gress to the appropriate officials of each of the several States of
the United States within five (5) days after it is approved.
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Sec. 3. The appropriate officials of each of the several
States of the United States shall thereafter take such action and
perform such acts as may be required by or in consonance
with their applicable laws to enforce and comply with this
Joint Resolution and call.
Sec. 4. No later than [date] each of the said States is to
conduct a special election for the sole purpose of electing dele-
gates to said Convention, in accordance with each State's duly
enacted or to be enacted laws, Provided, however, that at least
thirty days elapse between final nominations for delegates and
the election; that the number of delegates elected be equal to
the number of Congressmen each said State is then repre-
sented by with one to be chosen within each Congressional
district within said State plus two at-large; that the qualifica-
tions of the voters for delegates be no different than those re-
quired for the more numerous body of the State's legislature;
that delegates are to possess the qualifications required of a
member of the House of Representatives of the United States at
the time of convening; and that all statutes of the United
States and the several States disqualifying a person for public
office because he then holds another public office shall not
apply except as to the judges and justices of the United States.
Sec. 5. The delegates so duly elected and properly certi-
fied shall meet on the [date] at [place, building, hall] in Wash-
ington, District of Columbia, at ten o'clock in the forenoon,
present their credentials to the temporary secretary who is
hereby designated as [name or office], meet under the tem-
porary chairmanship of [name or office], and when at least a
majority thereof is so assembled then duly and regularly or-
ganize and deliberate for the purpose for which called, Pro-
vided, however, that any amendments to the Constitution of
the United States which may be proposed shall receive the ap-
proval of at least two-thirds of the members then present and
voting at the said Convention.
Sec. 6. The said Convention may authorize and direct that
all such proposed amendments be forwarded to the appropriate
officials designated by the Congress of the United States for the
purpose of forwarding to the States amendments proposed by
the said Convention, and said officials are hereby authorized and
directed so to act and forward said proposed amendments within
five (5) days after receipt thereof, together with a copy of the
section following.
Sec. 7. All such proposed amendments shall be inoperative
unless they shall have been ratified as amendments to the
Constitution by the legislatures of [or by conventions in] the
several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven
years from the date of the submission thereof to the States.
Sec. 8. Copies of all said ratifications, properly and duly
authenticated and certified, shall be forwarded to and filed with
the Administrator of General Services of the United States who
is hereby authorized and directed to receive and file the same
and, when the required number thereof pursuant to article V of
the Constitution has been so received and filed, shall make ap-
propriate proclamation thereof.
Sec. 9. There are hereby authorized to be appropriated
not more than [$___] for necessary expenses in conducting
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and defraying the costs of such Convention, but none of these
moneys is to be used for any travel, pay, allowances or like
purposes of any delegates to or member of such Convention. 0 4
104. If there is any question concerning the necessity for a statute,
requiring the President's signature, this can be easily accomplished.
However, does this mean that the President may veto the Convention?
Or that if two-thirds of Congress cannot be mustered the Convention
will not be held? It is suggested that here, if at all, is a justification
for an appropriation by Joint Resolution, without such a signature being
required.
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